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Banks and Banking-Lack of Power of National Bank Receiver to Sue
on Contract Whose Fraudulent Character Was Known to the Bank-The
receiver of an insolvent bank sued to recover on note-guaranty bonds of the de-
fendant. The bonds had been obtained by the president of the bank from defend-
ant's agent to serve as "window dressing" if bank examiners should ask to see
collateral for certain notes. Held (Justices Black and Reed dissenting), that the
claim of the receiver could rise no higher than that of the bank, and since the
bank was bound by the president's knowledge of the fraudulent character of
the transaction,' the receiver could not maintain the action on the bonds.
Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1938) 5 U. S. L.
WEEK 908.
It has long been established doctrine that the power of a corporate receiver
to sue is limited to actions which the corporation could have asserted if it had
remained a going concern, and any claim prosecuted by the receiver is subject
to defenses available against the corporation.2  However, an exception has been
grafted on the general rule to allow a receiver to attack transactions in fraud of
creditors where the corporation itself would have been unable to sue. 3 Originally,
this exception was employed only in cases involving transfers and conveyances in
fraud of creditors, 4 but its sphere of inclusion has been expanded by some courts
to allow a receiver actions on unpaid stock subscriptions,5 against holders of
watered stock," and in situations practically identical with that in the instant
case.7 The effect of the liberality of these latter decisions, which the dissenting
opinion would have the Court follow, is to cast doubt on the validity of the
general rule, if not to undermine it completely. But on the contrary, the Supreme
Court has exhibited little tendency to do away with the general rule. Even in
McCandless v. Furlaud 8 where there was a transfer of assets in fraud of credi-
tors, the type of case where the exception is normally employed, the Court found
it rather difficult to depart from the general rule; ' but the majority reasoned that
since a cause of action existed in favor of the creditors there was no objection
to having the receiver exercise it for them. In the instant case, therefore, where
the receiver sued on a bank contract without any allegations of fraud on the credi-
tors, it seems but natural that the Court should call a halt and limit the operation
I. The president's act was within the scope of his implied authority and therefore any
notice to him of its illegality was notice to the bank. See instant case, lower court, go F.
(2d) 862 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937).
2. Rankin v. City Nat. Bank, 208 U. S. 541 (igo8) ; Gillett v. Moore, 74 Colo. 484, 223
P. 21 (1924); HIGH, REcEIVERs (4th ed. igio) § 315.
3. See 2 CLARK, REcEIVERs (2d ed. 1929) § 802; HIGH, REcEIvERs (4th ed. 191o) § 315
et seq.
4. Keedy v. Stirling Electric Appliance Co., 13 Del. Ch. 66, 115 Atl. 359 (1921) ; Sayle
v. Guarantee Savings & Loan Co., 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N. s.) 40 (1903) ; Powers v. Hamil-
ton Paper Co., 6o Wis. 23, 18 N. W. 2o (1884).
5. State v. Associated Packing Co., 210 Ia. 754, 227 N. W. 627 (1929).
6. Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 17o N. Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't,
1918).
7. Golden v. Cervenka, 278 II1. 4o9, 116 N. E. 273 (1917) ; see Niblack v. Farley, 286
Ill. 536, 540, 122 N. E. i6o, 162 (1919).
8. 296 U. S. 14o (1935).
9. The decision was 5 to 4.
(895)
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of the McCandless case exception. The logic of the majority opinion can
scarcely be denied, since the receiver was attempting to sue on a corporate contract
on which the bank could not sue and to which the creditors were not parties.
Had the pleadings been sufficient to support an action in tort on behalf of the
injured creditors, 10 the argument of the dissent would be more convincing.
Coiflict of Laws-Lack of Power of Federal Courts to Disregard State
Decisions on Matters of General Law-Swift v. Tyson Overruled. Plaintiff,
a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought an action in a federal court against defend-
ant, a New York corporation, for injuries sustained whei struck by one of de-
fendant's trains in Pennsylvania. Defendant contended that its duty was to be
determined by reference to the decisions of the supreme court of Pennsylvania,
under which there would have been no liability, but the trial court, applying
its own view of the law, allowed recovery, and its judgment was affirmed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that since the question was one of
general law it was not necessary for the federal court to follow the Pennsyl-
vania decisions.' On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the Penn-
sylvania decisions should have been followed; the construction of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as permitting the federal courts to exercise independent judgment
on matters of general law is erroneous, and in so acting the federal courts have
been functioning unconstitutionally.' Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 5 U. S. L. Week
999 (Sup. Ct. U. S. April 25, 1938).
Thus is fulfilled the prophecy of Justice Field that the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson 3 would one day "die among its worshippers." 4 The opinion of Jus-
tice Story in that case, holding that Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 5
requires the federal courts to follow only the statutes and not the decision
law of the states in non-federal cases coming before them because of diversity
of citizenship, has long been criticized." Not only does it proceed upon an out-
moded theory of the nature of law--i e., that the decisions of the state courts
are not part of the state law but only evidence thereof 7-- but recent research
has conclusively shown this construction of the Act to be contrary to the actual
intent of Congress.8 The interpretation has also been criticized on constitu-
tional grounds, in that it permits the federal government to regulate judicially
io. "An examination of the pleadings makes it quite clear that the Receiver undertook
to set up rights acquired by the insolvent bank through duly executed contracts between it
and the Surety Company. He makes no suggestion of a purpose attributable to the company
to mislead creditors or others; makes no allegation of damage except that sustained by the
bank . . . he cannot rely on something not complained of. . . ." Majority opinion, in-
stant case at 909. The majority based its opinion on this defect in the pleading. The dissent
seemed to ignore it.
I. 90 F. (2d) 6o3, 604 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
2. Reed, J., concurred with the majority only insofar as the interpretation of the Judiciary
Act was concerned. Butler and McReynolds, JJ., concurred in the result on the ground that
the record showed plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence; overruling the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson was strongly opposed.
3. 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842).
4. Dissenting opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 390, 403
(1892).
5. i STAT. 92, §34 (1879), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1928).
6. For a comprehensive list of articles criticizing the decision, see notes 3 to 6, opinion
of Brandeis, J., in instant case at 1000.
7. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (3d ed. 1927) 249-256.
8. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
HARv. L. REV. 49.
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matters not within the legislative power of Congress.9 But the principal cause
for criticism of the doctrine has been that as a result of allowing the federal
courts to make their own conclusions as to the state law, a situation developed
in which co6rdinate but independent courts in the same state were applying
different rules to identical transactions. 10 Thus, instead of simply enabling
non-residents of a state to have their causes tried in a forum free from local
prejudices, which was all that the Act was intended to accomplish,"- the Act
as interpreted gave such litigants the unfair advantage of being able to have
a suit tried before a federal court in order to enjoy the application of a more
favorable rule of law, and has thus been the means of outright evasions of the
settled common law rules of the states.' 2 In defense of the doctrine it has been
contended that its operation would ultimately bring about uniformity in the law,
on the theory that the state courts would, in the event of a choice between two
possible views, tend to accept the view taken by the Supreme Court;' 8 there
are, however, relatively few indications of such a tendency.' 4 Consequently,
although for a long time the practice of the Court was to extend the applica-
tion of the doctrine far beyond the field of "general commercial law" occupied
by Mr. Justice Story,' 5 more recent decisions limited its application.' 6 An obvi-
9. Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and Its Dangers (1928) 15 VA. L.
REv. 137, 148; see also Field, J., dissenting in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S.
368, 390, 402 (1892). Under Mr. Justice Story's theory of law this difficulty was not present.
The tederal courts were not refusing to apply state law; they were simply refusing to accept
the state decisions as conclusive evidence of what the state law was.
1O. For a collection of cases illustrating this, see Note (1912) 4o L. R. A. (N. s.) 380.
ii. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF LAW (3d ed. 1927) 249; Warren, supra note 8.
12. Thus, in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U. S. S18 (1927), the plaintiff company, knowing that the contract with a
railroad whereby it was given an exclusive stand at a station in Kentucky was illegal under
the decisions of the Kentucky courts, procured its dissolution in that state, incorporated in
Tennessee, and on the basis of diversity of citizenship brought suit in a federal court in Ken-
tucky to enjoin the defendant company from using the stand. A decree granting an injunc-
tion was affirmed by the Supreme Court. For an extensive criticism of the case and the
theory of law implicit in its decision, see FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 42
et seq.
Another evil resulting in part from this situation has been the congestion in the federal
courts, ultimately placing an unnecessary burden on the Supreme Court. Frankfurter, Dis-
tribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q.
499.
13. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship
(1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. i79; Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made
State Law in State and Federal Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 533; Yntema and Jaffin, Pre-
liiniary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869, 881; see also
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOMIE CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924) 333.
14. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts
(1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 528. It has been asserted, however, that the matter has not been
studied sufficiently for any definite conclusion to be made. On the basis of an exhaustive
study of the cases involving the precise point decided in Swift v. Tyson it has been concluded
that on that question the tendency has been to follow the decision of the Supreme Court.
Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 86, 881. Judge Augustus Hand has pointed out, however, that with most federal cases
getting no further than the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the great factor influencing the state
courts to adopt the federal rules, the prominence of the Supreme Court, is no longer present.
Cole v. Pennsylvania R. R., 43 F. (2d) 953, 956 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).
15. E. g., in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (igio), in determining the lia-
bility of the buyer of all the coal underlying a tract of land for failure to support the surface,
the Court disregarded the state decisions, and reached a result directly opposite. For a recent
collection of cases showing the extent to which the doctrine has been applied, see Jacobson,
Federal Interpretation of State Law (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 335, 343.
16. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 (I934), 83 U. oF PA. L. Rev. 83 (held,
that uniform state laws codifying the common law must be construed in accordance with
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ous result of the instant decision is that decisions of the federal courts on com-
mon law questions are no longer authoritative,17 but this would seem, if any-
thing, to be an advantage, in that it reduces the number of possibly applicable
rules that must be considered in planning legal transactions."' So far as the
development of new rules of conflict of laws is concerned, the decision is not likely
to be of great effect. Under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, the ability to decide
cases on the basis of general law without having to refer to the law of any
particular state doubtless kept the federal courts' choice of law problems at a
minimum; where choice of law rules had to be applied, they were applied as mat-
ters of general law, 9 thus causing to develop separate federal rules on conflict
of laws. The tendency now will be in the opposite direction. While the
number of choice of law problems will increase, in solving them the courts will
probably not be applying a uniform system of rules. Since the federal courts
must apply the laws of the states, and the rules of conflict of laws are a part
of the law of each state,20 when confronted with such a problem a federal court
should apply the law of the state in which it is sitting.
Conflict of Laws-Law Applicable to Proper Form of Action and to
Determination of a "Seal" within the Meaning of the Statute of Limita-
tions-Plaintiff, more than six years after his cause of action accrued,
brought covenant in New Hampshire on a note containing a printed "seal"
executed in Florida. The instrument, though sealed by Florida law, was unsealed
under New Hampshire law. By the New Hampshire statute of limitations 1
six years was allowed for action on a simple contract, and twenty years on
specialties. A demurrer was sustained whereupon plaintiff amended so as to
declare in assumpsit, but contended that the instrument was nevertheless a
specialty within the meaning of the New Hampshire statute. Held, that since
both the form of action and definition of a specialty within the statute were mat-
ters of procedure to which the law of the forum applied, plaintiff's contention was
inconsistent, and that, in any event, plaintiff could not succeed since by the lex
fori the instrument was unsealed and the six year statute was applicable. Burns
Mortgage Co. v. Hardy, 94 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. Ist, 1938).
state decisions); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335 (1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv.
523 (1935) (whether failure of insured to give notice was excused by disability held gov-
erned by state law).
17. Dissenting opinion of Butler, J., instant case at 1002, 1003. A subsequent decision,
Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 5 U. S. L. WEEK 1055 (U. S. Sup. Ct., May 2, 1938),
gives a significant indication of the status of cases now in the federal courts. A decision con-
struing a life insurance policy was reversed in that case because although the lower court had
stated that its conclusion was not inconsistent with the law of Pennsylvania, the place of
contracting, the question was determined primarily as one of federal law. The Ruhlin case
also points out that since the federal courts are administering state and not federal law, lack
of uniformity among the circuits on non-federal common law questions will no longer be a
ground for granting certiorari, a factor which should result in decreasing the amount of non-
federal business before the Supreme Court. Cf. supra note ii.
I8. Thus in matters of contract, counsel need not fear that even though a provision in a
contract is valid by the law of the place of contracting and the law of the place of perform-
ance it may be denied enforcement by a federal court on the ground of conflict with federal
common law, as in Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405, 409 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923), cited in von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence (1926)
74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 270. 287.
19. See Ex parte Heidelback, ii Fed. Cas. No. 6,322 at 1022 (D. Mass. 1876).
20. GooDmicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 6; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
§5.
I. N. H. Pub. Laws, c. 329, §§ 3, 4.
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Since it is well settled in American law that the form of action is a matter of
procedure to be determined by the law of the forum, 2 and since it is generally
held that the question as to whether an action is barred by a statute of limitations,
together with such preliminary questions thereto as the sealed or unsealed nature
of an instrument, is likewise to be determined by the law of the forum,3 the plain-
tiff's dilemma is apparent. His action in covenant will be demurrable since,
under the le: fori, the instrument is unsealed. His action in assumpsit cannot
succeed since the instrument is equally unsealed within the meaning of that term
in the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's unfortunate position, however, is
sanctioned by the highest authority.4 Questions of the form and limitation of
action are said to be procedural rather than substantive, and are to be governed
by the law of the forum for the sake of simplicity and convenience in the adminis-
tration of justice.' Whether or not such a length of time has transpired as will
interfere with the dispensation of substantial justice has been considered a problem
to be resolved by the public policy of the forum.6 The very foundations of these
rules, nevertheless, have been subject to attack because of the difficulties inherent
in any distinction between substance and procedure. It has been suggested, for
example, that while in some circumstances, the form of action is so little related
to the substantive rights of the parties as to be properly for the determination
of the lex fori, in other situations it might be so closely related as, in justice, to
call for an application of the law of the place of contracting.7 Furthermore,
within the United States, differences in modes of administration are so slight as
to negative the possibility of that inconvenience in the application of foreign law
which, in an earlier era, brought forth the substance-procedure distinction.s
Finally, the point has been made that to apply the lex fori leaves uncertain the
duration of a defendant's liability, giving to the parties an opportunity to vary the
obligation by a change of jurisdiction.9 Hence, it is said that as the contract was
made in a foreign state, it is just to attach the same legal consequences to the
operative facts as is done by that foreign state.10 Despite theoretical objections,
however, the majority American view, as followed in the instant case, has re-
mained unaltered, being sustained perhaps by its simplicity, and by the confusion
and disagreement in the ranks of the opposition."
2. Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361 (U. S. 1834); Douglass and Faruum
v. Oldham, 6 N. H. i5o (833); Nowell v. Waterman, 53 R. I. i6, 163 At. 402 (1932); 3
BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws (935) § 587.1; GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAws (1927) § 82.
3. Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361 (U. S. 1834) ; Kirsch v. Lubin, 131
Misc. 700, 228 N. Y. Supp. 94 (Sup. Ct. 1927). Conversely, where the instrument is sealed
in accordance with the law of the state of suit, the action is not barred, though the instru-
ment is unsealed at the place of contracting and hence unenforcible. Watson v. Brewster.
I Barr 381 (Pa. 1845). GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 85.
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 587, comment b, 603, 604; 3 BEALE, op.
cit. supra note 2, at § 587.2, 6o3.2; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 82, 85.
5. Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws (933) 31 MICH. L. REv. 474,
497.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 6o3, comment a; 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at § 603.2. The statute of the forum has been held to apply despite the fact that the
law of the jurisdiction governing the substantive rights of the parties would bar the remedy.
Millar v. Hilton, I89 Mich. 635, 255 N. W. 574 (1915) ; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v.
Maine Cent. R. Co., 78 N. H. 553, 1O3 Atl. 263 (ii8).
7. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (933) 42 YALE L. J. 333,
352. It has been suggested that "the lex loci should be applied in those classes of cases where
the result is so materially affected by the difference in the rule as to outweigh the incon-
venience if any in departing from the procedural law of the forum." Note (igis) 18 COL.
L. Rwv. 354, 356.
8. Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1112, 1117-18.
9. An argument advanced by French lawyers, cited in Ailes, op. cit. supra note 5, at 499.
IO. Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws (1919) 28 YALE L. J.
492, 495.
ixi. Ailes, op. cit. supra note 5, at 498; Note (935) NE. L. BULL. 267.
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Conflict of Laws-Unenforceability of Foreign Court Order Concern-
ing Local Trust Over Which Jurisdiction Was Lacking-The settlor, a
resident of California, established an inter vivos trust of property situated in
Massachusetts for the benefit of his minor children who were domiciled in Ohio.
It was provided that the trust was to be administered by a Massachusetts trustee
according to the laws of that state, but there was a provision that payments of
principal could be made on behalf of the children upon order of the probate
court of Miami County, Ohio. Plaintiffs, who as attorneys had been instru-
mental in obtaining the trust, applied to the Ohio court for compensation. The
trustee, having appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction, withdrew by leave
of court. Thereafter, compensation was awarded the plaintiffs and ordered to
be paid out of the corpus of the trust. In an action in Massachusetts upon the
Ohio decree, it was held that the plaintiffs could not recover because the Ohio
court had jurisdiction neither over the trustee nor the res of the trust. Harvey
v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 13 N. E. (2d) 299 (Mass. 1938).
As the trust res in the instant case was situated in Massachusetts, it is clear
that jurisdiction over the property rested with the courts of Massachusetts, and
not those of Ohio.' Furthermore, it was decided that the Ohio court acquired
no personal jurisdiction over the trustee through his special appearance.2 It
might be argued, however, by analogy to contract cases," that a trustee by
accepting the terms of the trust, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the state
where the administration of the trust is to be carried on.4 It becomes important,
therefore, to determine in what state the administration of the trust in the instant
case took place. Owing to the comparatively recent growth of the inter vivos
trust, the courts are at variance as to the method of determining what state has
jurisdiction over the administration of a trust where the property and the par-
ties involved are not all located in a single state.5 Some courts apply, as in
the case of testamentary trusts,6 the test of the domicil of the settlor,7 under the
dogma of mobilia sequuntur personam8 However, this view has been specifically
repudiated as contrary to the intent of the settlor ' and likely to burden the
trustee unduly.' 0 A more favored view, and that adopted by the Restatement,"'
is that jurisdiction rests with the courts of that state in which the trust instru-
i. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 (1934) (chattels); First
Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N. W. I (1932) (chattels); Wimer v.
Wimer, 82 Va. 8go, 5 S. E. 536 (1888) (real estate); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §§48, 49.
2. The Ohio court, by permitting the trustee to withdraw from the Ohio action before
the case was heard on its merits, lost whatever jurisdiction over him it might otherwise have
had. Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 603 (D. Mass. 1882) ; McArthur v. Leffler, i1O Ind. 526,
io N. E. 81 (1887). For a discussion of the invalidity of a judgment where a court does not
have jurisdiction over the person, see GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 131.
3. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (ig3i) (consent to arbitration);
Pirie v. H. Stern, Jr. & Bro. Co., 97 Wis. 150, 72 N. W. 370 (1897) (note authorizing con-
fession of judgment).
4. "A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual who consents
to such exercise of jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 81.
5. For an excellent analysis of the whole problem, see Beale, Living Trusts of Movables
in the Conflict of Laws (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 969; Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the
Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HARV. L. REv. 161. For a complete collection of the cases under
the different views, see Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. lO23.
6. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2o8 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).
7. Swetland v. Swetland, 105 N. J. Eq. 6o8, 149 Atl. 50 (930), aff'd, 107 N. J. Eq. 504,
153 AtI. 907 (1931).
8. The use of the dogma in this country has been attributed to its importation from
France by Story. Beale, supra note 5, at 970, n. 2.
9. See Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 394, 187 N. E. 65, 70 (1933).
10. Cavers, supra note 5, at 189.
II. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 297.
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ment places the administration of the trust. To determine this, consideration is
given to the location of the corpus of the trust,12 the trustee, and the benefi-
ciaries, as well as to the apparent intent of the settlor. 3 In the instant case,
the fact that the beneficiaries resided in Ohio, and that the settlor directed that
payments of principal be made on their behalf at the discretion of an Ohio
court, tended to warrant control of the trust by Ohio. However, since both the
trustee and the property were in Massachusetts, and the settlor specifically pro-
vided that the trust be administered in, and under the laws of, that state, it would
seem that the domicil of the beneficiaries should be disregarded, 4 and that
Massachusetts, not Ohio, had jurisdiction over the trust. Such a conclusion
not only takes cognizance of the physical location of both trustee and property,
but also enforces the apparent intent of the settlor.. 5 Once it is assumed that
jurisdiction rested in Massachusetts, the provision that payments of principal
be made at the discretion of the Ohio court cannot have the effect of giving to
that court a jurisdiction to which it was not entitled by law.' 6
Constitutional Law-Invalidity of Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency
Judgment Act of 1937-Plaintiff mortgagee, after entering judgment on
default of the mortgagor, applied for a writ of levari facias directing the sheriff
to proceed with execution on the judgment. Prothonotary refused to issue the
writ on grounds of failure of plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the 1937
Deficiency Judgment Act I which required him either to file a statement releasing
the obligor from personal liability, or to have the fair market value of the mort-
gaged premises fixed by the court. Plaintiff then applied for a writ of mandamus
to compel the prothonotary to issue the writ. Held, that mandamus should be
granted, because the Deficiency Judgment Act, being an unreasonable discrimina-
tion against one particular class of creditors, violates the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion 2 which prohibits any special law changing the method of collecting debts, the
method of enforcing judgments, or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real
estate. Pennsylvania Company v. Scott, Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
March 23, 1938, p. I, col. 5-
The Pennsylvania courts have thus for the third time declared a Mortgage
Deficiency Judgment Act unconstitutional.3 In view of their previously ex-
pressed attitude toward this type of legislation, the invalidation of the instant
Act was not surprising, and indeed was forecast in a recent issue of the REVIEW. 4
12. See, for example, Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y. Supp. 1O3 (ist
Dep't, 1918).
13. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs (934) § 297, comment d.
14. The weakness of using the domicil of the beneficiaries for determination of the situs
of the trust is apparent where the beneficiaries themselves live in different states. Cavers,
stpra note 5, at 189.
15. Accord: Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937) (intent
of settlor carried out).
16. Crabtree v. Miller, 229 Ala. 103, 155 So. 529 (934); Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. io4,
188 N. E. 889 (1934). See Christensen v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 216 App. Div.
274, 283, 214 N. Y. Supp. 732, 741 (2d Dep't, 1926), aff'd, 243 N. Y. 587, 154 N. E. 616
(1926).
i. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 561.
2. PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 7.
3. The 1934 Act was declared unconstitutional in Beaver County B. & L. Ass'n v. Wino-
wich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 Atl. 481 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 14. The 1935 Act was de-
clared unconstitutional by the Superior Court in Shallcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick B. &
L. Ass'n, 123 Pa. Super. 593, 187 Atl. 819 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 321 (1937).
4. Legis. (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 295, 300.
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Both prior Acts were invalidated on grounds of impairment of contractual obliga-
tions. However, the broad grounds of special legislation as a reason for nullify-
ing a mortgage deficiency judgment act was employed for the first time by the
instant court. This may be partially explained by the fact that the instant Act
differed in some material aspects from its predecessors. 5  On the other hand,
whether the changes so wrought are of such a nature as to be unreasonably dis-
criminatory legislation is a fine point.6 The court's conclusion might well be
questioned, but the test for determining the existence of unreasonable discrimi-
nation is so general in its nature that there is little objective criterion by which
the instant result can be evaluated. In any event, by holding the Act unconsti-
tutional on such sweeping grounds, the instant decision would seem to preclude
any further attempts for relief of mortgage debtors in Pennsylvania through
deficiency judgment legislation; a constitutional defect of this nature could not
easily be remedied by minor changes in the statutory provisions.
Constitutional Law-Limitation on Power of Legislature to Authorize
Governor to Remove Public Officer Without Cause-A statute authorized
the governor to appoint certain public officers for terms of six years, and also to
remove them without cause.' The state constitution provided that all public
officers should hold their offices "on condition that they behave themselves well." 2
Three methods of removal were also provided in the constitution, each of which
was limited to a removal for specified cause.3 Incumbents were removed from
office by the governor without cause. On quo warranto proceedings brought
to oust their successors, held (one judge dissenting), that judgment of ouster
be entered, as the removal clause of the statute was unconstitutional. State ex rel.
Green v. Collision, 197 Atl. 836 (Del. Super. 1938) . 4
The majority and the dissenting judge differed on both of the two questions
that confronted the court: the construction of the constitution and the construc-
tion of the statute. The majority reasoned that since the constitution stipulated
that public officers should hold office on good behavior, and since the three
methods of removal authorized were all founded upon cause, there was by impli-
cation a restriction on the power of the legislature that prevented an authorization
to remove without cause. 5 The dissent concluded that offices created by the
5. See ibid. for a complete discussion.
6. The court used the familiar test as to what constitutes special legislation that is ex-
posited in Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, 16 Atl. 356, 363 (1889) and held that the instant
Act was unreasonable since, the difference between mortgage creditors and other creditors
was not a ". . . necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those
of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each
class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others".
i. DEL REv. CODE (1935) § 6o93.
2. DEL. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
3. Art. XV, § 6, provides that the governor may remove a public officer convicted of mis-
behavior in office or any infamous crime. Art. III, § 13, provides that the governor may for
reasonable cause remove any officer upon petition of two-thirds of all the members of both
houses of the assembly. Art. VI, § 2, provides for impeachment for treason, bribery, or other
high crime or misdemeanor.
4- The public officers involved were members of the Industrial Accident Board under
Workmen's Compensation Law.
5. Accord: Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. 237 (Ky. i86o) (constitutional office) ; In
re Bowman, 225 Pa. 364, 74 Atl. 203 (19o9) (constitutional office) ; see People v. Howland,
155 N. Y. 270, 277, 49 N. E. 775, 777 (898) (constitutional office). Williams v. State, I97
Ala. 40, 72 So. 330 (1916) (statutory office) ; Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 'i9 N. W.
112 (884) (statutory office) ; Lizano v. City of Pass Christian, g6 Miss. 640, 50 So. 98I
(igio) (statutory office).
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legislature are entirely within legislative control, and that in absence of an express
restriction on the power of the legislature, none could be implied. But the ma-
jority's contention, that unless the constitutional provisions for removal were
intended to be exclusive of other methods they were empty phrases, is not easily
met." Moreover the history of the debates preceding adoption of the constitution
showed unmistakably that the intent of the framers was to prevent the possibility
that officers might be removed without cause.7  Not only was this intention
specifically stated by the framers when they were considering the wording of the
sections in question, but the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, allow-
ing appointed officers to be removed at the pleasure of the appointing power, was
considered and rejected.8 The court was also divided on the question of statu-
tory construction. The statute provided for a "term of six years". A subse-
quent paragraph stipulated that the governor might remove the incumbent "with
or without cause". The majority felt that the plain and unambiguous import of
these words was to create an office for a fixed term with arbitrary power of
removal.' The dissent reasoned that the effect of the statute was to create only
an indeterminate term not exceeding six years, to be determined at the pleasure
of the governor.'0 But it is questionable whether even this construction would
make the statute less objectionable. To hold the statute constitutional under
either construction would be to enable the legislature to make the tenure of all
officials whose positions are created by statute, in any branch of government
whatever, subject to the will of the executive. That this would devitalize the
constitutional provisions involved is plain. The evident purpose of the framers
was to promote in public officials an independence of executive coercion, and to
make tenure of office more secure, and thereby to encourage men of ability to
accept office." To uphold the statute in question would be to defeat these
objectives.
Evidence-Admissibility in Evidence of Results of Lie-Detector Test-
Before his retrial for the crime of burglary, defendant submitted to a lie-detector
test made with a psychogalvanometer at Fordham University, which showed him
to be innocent. The district attorney objected to the admission of expert testi-
6. In support of the doctrine of implied prohibitions in a constitution, see COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIoNAL LImiTATIONs (7th ed. i9o3) 99. Accord, as to implied prohibitions: People v.
Bull, 46 N. Y. 57 (187) ; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. iog (z868).
7. Instant case at 842 et seq. Judge Spruance, in referring to the provision of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, cited infra note 8, said, "That seems to be without any cause at all.
Of course, we do not want that."
See COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 6, at ioI. "When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining
the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particu-
lar provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed
the instrument."
8. PA. CONsT. art. VI, § 4.
9. The majority relied on the rule that where words are so plain that they can have but
one meaning, it is not permissible to "interpret". See ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
(i888) 6, and cases cited.
io. The dissent relied on two rules of statutory construction: first, that where an act
is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will uphold the validity of the act, the
other of which will make it unconstitutional, the one that will sustain the constitutionality
should be applied, ENDLICH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 246 et seq., and cases cited; second, that
significance and effect shall be given to every section, clause, word, or part of the act, END-
LicH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 29 et seq., and cases cited.
ii. This consideration influenced the framers of the Delaware Constitution, as appears
in the discussion in the instant case, at 844 et seq. The court, at p. 841, also was impressed
by the thought. Referring to the Federal Constitution, it cited Webster as arguing that an
uncontrollable power of removal tends to "turn the whole body of public officers into parti-
sans, dependents, favorites, sycophants, and manworshippers".
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mony based on data secured by the test. Held, that the objection should be over-
ruled and the testimony received and evaluated by the jury. People v. Kenny,
Queens County Ct., N. Y. L. J., March 31, 1938, p. I55I, col. 6.
Several methods have been advanced by experimental psychometry for
obtaining data to value testimonial evidence.' Best known among them is the
Marston systolic blood pressure test 2 which proceeds on the theory that the
conscious volition necessary to repress a true utterance and to substitute a false
one causes changes in the heart action which are reflected in the subject's systolic
blood pressure. Wigmore has designated this test as the only one which has
demonstrated any utility." Expert testimony based on the Marston test has been
admitted by trial courts in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin. 4  The only
appellate courts, however, which have passed on the admissibility of such evi-
dence, have rejected it 5 on the ground that the test upon which it is based has
not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition as to justify its admission.
The test employed in the instant case measures the variation in resistance of the
skin to electric currents administered during emotional disturbances, the varia-
tion being attributable to changes in the activity of the sweat glands." Although
the instant court was undoubtedly impressed by the accuracy record claimed for
this test,7 it has generally been considered unreliable inasmuch as it records
emotional reactions other than those produced by lying, such as fear and excite-
ment.8  Certainly when a scientifically proved deception test is perfected, it
should be welcomed by the courts.9 However, in view of the manifest possi-
bilities for mistake and deception in the interpretation of data, it would be
advisable, if such evidence is to be admitted at all, to admit only evidence based
on the most widely recognized test.
Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations of Intention and Against Interest-
Defendant was charged with unlawfully producing a miscarriage resulting in
death. The State offered, inter alia, evidence that deceased told the witness she
was going to see defendant to have an abortion. The trial court charged that
this evidence was admissible and could be considered to show that the abortion
I. Principal among these are the Jung association word-time reaction test, the Marston
systolic blood pressure test, the galvanometer test which measures the activity of the sweat
glands, the so-called "truth serum" or "twilight sleep" and the Benussi respiration test. See
MARSTON, THE LIE DETECTOR TEST (1938) c. II, Boox NoTE, 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 694; 3
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (iith ed. 1935) § 1429; WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL
PROOF (3d ed. 1937) ch. XXVII; McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence
(1927) 15 CALIF. L. REV. 484; Note (924) 33 YALE L. J. 771.
2. This test is fully described in MARSTON, THE LIE DETECTOR TEST (1938).
3. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 317.
4- MARSTON, THE LIE DETECTOR TEST (1938) 69.
5. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923), 34 A. L. R. 145 (1925), 24
COL L. REv. 429 (1924), 37 HARv. L. REV. 1138; State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W.
314 (1933), 86 A. L. R. 611 (1934), 13 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 321 (I933), 24 J. CRim. LAW
440 (934), i8 MINN. L. REV. 76 (933), 8 WIs. L. REV. 283. Both cases involved the ad-
missibility of evidence based on the Marston test. However, in the Bohner case the tests
were conducted by Dr. Leonard Keeler of the University of Chicago, who, in administering
the test, uses a continuous blood pressure record (obtained by the use of a polygraph) rather
than the discontinuous method employed by Marston (obtained with a sphygmomanometer).
6. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 316; see also McCormick, op. cit. supra note I, 492.
7. "In one laboratory test, 271 persons were examined. The results of this examination
showed that 49 out of the 50 guilty persons were detected by this procedure. In the accom-
plice group of io2 person Ioo were detected. In the innocent group of n19 persons all were
detected." The foregoing quotation by the court refers to tests conducted with the psychogal-
vanometer by Father Walter G. Summers at Fordham University.
8. McCormick, loc. cit. supra note 6; MARSTON, THE LIE D.ThCTOR TF ST (1938) 39-41.
9. See WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1935) § 903; 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) § 875.
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was probably done as planned. The trial court also received evidence that
deceased told the witness that defendant told her he would perform the operation.
Held (one judge dissenting), that the first offer was admissible but only to
show defendant had an opportunity to commit the abortion and not that he had
done so; the second offer, not coming within an exception to the hearsay rule, was
inadmissible.' State v. Phillips, 277 N. W. 609 (N. D. 1938).
The instant court recognizes the modern exception to the hearsay rule which
was created in the Hillnon Case 2 for declarations of intention. However, while
holding the first offer of evidence relevant under this exception and then dis-
approving of the trial court's charge, the appellate court seems to involve itself
in a contradiction. If the evidence is relevant it must relate to the ultimate issue
of guilt. This, of course, it must do through a series of inferences. Here that
series would seem to be that declarant had the intent to consult defendant, that
she fulfilled this intent and did consult him, that this gave him an opportunity to
commit the crime,3 and that he seized the opportunity and did commit it. The
appellate court in prohibiting the final inference nullified the effect of the evidence
altogether.4
In reversing the trial court for admitting the second offer of evidence, the
court did not discuss the possibility that it came under an exception to the hear-
say rule as a declaration against interest. The statement would be a declaration
against penal interest for by statute in North Dakota it is a crime for a woman
to solicit or submit to an abortion.5 Nevertheless, the ruling is consistent with
the case law of the majority of jurisdictions, where this exception to the hearsay
rule is limited to declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interests. 6  But
there is a growing minority 7 which accepts the suggestion that the authorities 8
in the field of evidence have long been making, that the exception should be
extended to cover declarations against penal interests. Exceptions to the hearsay
rule are based on the assumption that some statements, though unsworn and not
I. The court did not consider the testimony under the theory of a conspiracy. The one
dissenting judge would hold all the evidence admissible as declarations of a co-conspirator
which are admissible against all the conspirators when made during the life of the conspiracy,
and in furtherance thereof. If his interpretations of the facts be correct, there can be little
doubt as to the evidence being admissible. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EvIDENCE (lith ed. 1935)
§ 705; 2 WIGmoRE, EVImNCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1079. But cf. State v. Mattson, 53 N. D. 486,
2o6 N. W. 778 (1925).
2. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285 (1892), 7 HARV. L. REV. 117. For a
discussion of this case see Maguire, The Huh non Case-Thirty-Three Years After (1925)
38 HARv. L. REV. 709. A criticism of the case is found in Seligman, An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule (191:) 26 HARV. L. REv. 146. This doctrine has been limited to declarations
of future intention. Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96 (1933).
3. Of course opportunity to commit the crime though admissible as tending to show the
commission of the rrime, standing alone would not sustain a finding of guilt. I WIGMoRE,
EvIDNcE (2d ed. 1923) § 131.
4. The instant court also emphasizes the fact that the declarant's statements are admis-
sible to show her own plan, but not that of defendant's. The Hilhinon case is contra. In
that case, Walter's statement that he was going to Crooked Creek with Hillmon were admit-
ted to show that he in fact went and "that he went with Hillmon". 145 U. S. 285, 296 (italics
supplied). This feature of the case is criticized by Maguire, op. cit. supra, note 2.
5. 2 N. D. ComP. LAws (1913) § 9604.
6. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243 (1913) ; Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104, 244
Pac. 69 (1926) ; Powers v. State, 168 Miss. 541, 151 So. 730 (1933). This limitation was
started by the Sussex Peerage Case, ii C. & F. 86 (1844). Perhaps this could be considered
as a declaration against pecuniary interest for if it were false, the declarant would be subject
to a suit for libel.
7. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843 (1923), 9 CORN. L. Q. 57, 9 VA.
L. Q. 457, 1O VA. L. REv. 83. See Note (1937) 21 MINN. L. Rzv. i8r.
8. Holmes, J., dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 277; 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1476; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas (1932) 1o
TEX. L. REv. 399, 409.
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subject to cross-examination, are made under such compelling circumstances that
they are trustworthy without these safeguards. Certainly when the declarant
makes a statement which admits her guilt of a crime, the utterance is as dis-
serving as one which would cause her to lose money. Both should be admitted
on the same grounds.
Labor Law-Constitutionality of Maximum-hour Legislation of Penn-
sylvania and Montana-The Pennsylvania Act of 1937 " provided for a
forty-four-hour week for employees, 2 giving to the Secretary of Labor -and Indus-
try, with approval of the Industrial Board, the power to make variations from
the schedule of hours where unnecessary hardships would otherwise arise and
where the intent and purpose of the Act would otherwise be violated. The title
of the Act stated that its purpose is to protect the public health and welfare.
Held, that the Act is unconstitutional, on the theory that there was no substan-
tial relationship between the provisions of the Statute and public health and
welfare,8 and that there was an unlawful delegation of power by the legislature
to the Secretary to grant variations with no basic principle or standard to govern
his exercise of this power.4 Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 2 LAB. REL. REP. 163
(C. P. Dauphin County, Pa. 1938).
The Montana Code 5 provided that, in all cities and towns of more than
25oo persons, eight hours constitute a day's work and forty-eight a week's work
for all employees in retail stores and related occupations. 6 Held, that the order
of the lower court, sustaining a demurrer to an information charging violation
of the Code, should be reversed since the Act is a constitutional exercise of the
sovereign police power of the state. Montana v. Safeway Stores, Inc., I LAB.
REL. REP. 703 (Mont. 1938).
The tendency of the courts, with the exception of the widely-criticized7
Lochner case,' has been to uphold maximum-hour regulation of labor as to women
and children generally and as to men employed in certain occupations. 9 The
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, §§ 921-931.
2. With certain exceptions: (I) agricultural occupations, (2) domestic service in pri-
vate homes, (3) executives, earning over $25 per week, and (4) learned professions. PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 922 (c).
3. Another ground offered by the court is that the Act makes no provision for working
overtime and that emergencies may arise which will result in large economic losses because
of the requirement that the employee stop work after eight hours. Instant case at 163.
4. On delegation point, the court based its decision on Schechter Corp. v. United States,
295 U. S. 495 (1935) (N. I. R. A.); O'Neil v. American Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72 (1895).
5. MONT. REV. CODES (I934) § 3073.1.
6. The act applied to (I) all employed in retail stores, (2) employees in leased busi-
nesses where lessor dictates price, hours and conditions, (3) those employed to deliver goods
. sold in such stores, (4) employees in wholesale warehouses, used for supplying retailers with
goods, and (5) employees who deliver goods from warehouse to retailer.
7. For criticism of the Lochner case view see Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Four-
feenth Amendment (1909) 7 MICH. L. REv. 643, 666 et seq.; Frankfurter, Hours of Labor
and Realsmn in Constitutional Law (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 353; Freund, Limitations of
Hours of Labor and the Federal Suprene Court (9o5) 17 GREEN BAG 411; Pound, Liberty
of Contract (19o9) IS YALE L. J. 454.
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1904) (holding unconstitutional a ten-hour-day
provision for bakery shops). Other cases invalidating like provisions are United States v.
Northern Commercial Co., 6 Alaska 94 (1918); Commonwealth v. Boston & M. R. R., 222
Mass. 2o6, iO N. E. 264 (915); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N. W. 362
(1894) ; State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204 (1933).
g. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898) (upheld 8-hour day for workers in under-
ground mines-dangerous activity); Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412 (1908) (women);
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) (mills, factories, and manufacturing establish-
ments) ; WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1936) 734; ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR
LEGISLATION (4th rev. ed. 1937) 140.
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exact ground of these decisions is not dear, although the courts have often
stressed the harmful effect of unlimited hours on the health of the workers. But
whatever the basis may be, it is held that control of hours of work is within the
state police power and the state legislature may, at its discretion, determine the
length of the working day and the class of employees to whom the act shall apply;
only upon a clear showing that such legislative discretion is arbitrary will it be
upset by the courts.' 0 No state act has been tested which like the Pennsylvania
statute seeks to place a blanket regulation upon all employment." Although such a
general maximum-hour regulation would remove any contention of discrimination
between different classes of workers, the Pennsylvania court found it difficult to
see how longer hours of employment in occupations involving little manual labor
and under healthful conditions would be injurious to the health of the worker.
12
While this requirement of some relationship to the health of the worker has been
spoken of as important by the courts, it is extremely doubtful that a direct connec-
tion with the health of the employee must be found in all classes of employment
affected by the act before it will be upheld. If such were the rule it would seem
impossible to justify the validity of statutes which regulate the hours of all women
employees or of men employees in such broad categories as all manufacturing
establishments; and yet both the latter types of statutes have been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court.18 It is significant, therefore, that the court
in the Montana decision indicated that an act would be valid which might reason-
ably accomplish an adjustment of unemployment or which might reasonably
promote the welfare and prosperity of the state as a whole.' 4 This statement of
the rule would seem to be more in harmony with both the factual holdings of the
former maximum-hour eases and the modern principles governing the due-process
requirement in other fields of the law.' 5
Taxation-Gift Tax-Donor Entitled to Present Gift Exemption for
Each Beneficiary of a Single Trust-The taxpayer created an irrevocable
life insurance trust for the benefit of his seven children, the income to be paid to
them equally beginning with his death. Held, that the donor was entitled to
seven $5,000 present gift exemptions since the cestuis que trust rather than the
trust as an entity are the donees within the meaning of § 504 (b) of the Revenue
Act of 1932,' Davidson v. Welch, 22 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1938). Contra:
Knox v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 36 B. T. A. Oct. 8, 1937.
Minimum-wage regulations have obtained like recognition. The case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), criticised in Powell, Judiciality of Minimum-Wage
Legislation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 545, Note (1923) 7, U. OF PA. L. REv. 36o, Note
(933) 42 YALE L. J. 1250, upset decisions upholding minimum-wage legislation, but this
case has been expressly overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 400
(1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 117 (on lower court decision). For helpful annotations on
minimum-wage question, see Note (1937) io8 A. L. R. 1345. There has been no statute
tested which provides minimum-wages for men.
io. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) ; see Muller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 382
(19z5); ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEnISLATION (4th rev. ed. 1937) 140. Cf. West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 400 (1937).
ii. Cf. United States v. Northern Commercial Co., 6 Alaska 94 (i915), where a general
8-hour day was held unconstitutional.
12. Instant Pennsylvania case at 164.
13. See supra note 9.
14. Instant Montana case at 703.
15. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934).
I. 47 STAT. 247 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 553 (b) (1935). "In the case of gifts (other
than of future interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar
year, the first $5ooo of such gifts to such person shall not, for the purposes of sub-section
(a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during the year."
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Since the Treasury Department has acquiesced in the holding of Wells v.
Commissioner,2 that an interest other than future is involved in such trusts, the
issue in the instant case has narrowed to a determination of whether the donor
is entitled to more than one exemption where the trust has multiple beneficiaries;
and this depends on whether the single trust or the seven beneficiaries are con-
sidered the donees. In originally determining that there was a present gift in-
volved, the courts advanced conflicting theories as to who was the donee. Since
the exemption is applicable to gifts made to any person, and the Act defines a
person inter alia as a trust,' it has been held that the trust as an entity is the
donee.4 But the opinion has also been advanced that even if the nature of the
interest transferred was determined by what the cestui que trust received, it
would be one other than a future interest.5 Although the instant court, in adopt-
ing the latter view, relied principally on the practical consideration that the donor
thought he was making a gift to each of his children and that there was no dif-
ference between one trust for seven beneficiaries and seven trusts for single
beneficiaries, the concept that the cestui is the real donee finds support in a
number of considerations. It appears from the Committee Reports on the Reve-
nue Act of 1932 6 discussing the tax generally that Congress believed that the
beneficiary and not the trust was the donee. Similarly Congress recognized that
the beneficiary was the real donee when it exempted from the tax that portion of
the present value of a transfer in trust which inured to charity.7 Furthermore,
it has been recognized that where a settlor has irrevocably transferred property
to a trust, reserving only the power to change the beneficiary to persons other
than himself, there is no taxable gift since the cestuis que trust are not finally
determined, and a gift requires a definite donee. s Therefore, while it is difficult
to overlook the usual recognition of an irrevocable trust as a legal entity for tax
purposes and to avoid the fact that the trustee and not the beneficiary is the only
one having ani mmediate legal interest in the property, it seems wiser to recognize
that the gift tax should apply to the shifting of economic benefit rather than
of bare legal title. 9
2. 34 B. T. A. 315 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; acquiesced in,
INT. REv. BULL. no. 9, at 9 (1938) withdrawing nonacquiescence, XV-i Cum. BULL. 48
(1936).
3. 47 STAT. 289 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1696 (1) ('935).
4. Commissioner v. Wells, 88 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937). See Commissioner v.
Krebs, go F. (2d) 88, 88i (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ; Noyes v. Hassett, 2o F. Supp. 31, 32 (D.
Mass. 1937).
5. See Commissioner v. Krebs, go F. (2d) 88o, 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ; Noyes v. Has-
sett, 20 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Mass. 1937); Wells v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 315, 318
(1936).
6. 3 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. f 3935.010. ". • • (7) Where A creates a revocable
trust naming B as beneficiary, a gift to B of the corpus is effected when A relinquishes the
power to revoke ..
7. 47 STAT. 247 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 554 (a) (2) (1935). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 79,
Art. 13.
8. Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). The court was influenced by
the fact that the cestui as donee might be subject to the statutory liability of a donee for the
donor's non-payment of the gift tax.
Cf. REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY (936) § 153, comment i: "Consequently it is necessary
ps .s.lto recognize the coexistence of two different kinds of 'present interests', namely the
possible beneficiary's right to the immediate beneficial enjoyment of the proceeds of the trust
• . and the trustee's right forthwith to have the control and management of the affected
thing pursuant to the provisions of the trust."
9. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 287 (1933).
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Torts-Immunity of Parent from Liability to Unemancipated Minor
Child for Negligent Injury-Defendant negligently backed his truck over
his two-year-old son. The son's guardian, appointed a few weeks after the acci-
dent, sued to recover for the injuries. Held, that an unemancipated minor child
may not maintain an action against his parent for personal injuries suffered
through the latter's negligence. The decision was strictly confined to the case
presented. Luster v. Luster, 13 N. E. (2d) 438 (Mass. 1938).
Although the overwhelming majority rule ' adopted by the court in the
instant case can hardly be sustained from a strictly logical point of view, the
courts have generally refused to allow such an action for reasons of public policy,
2
and on the grounds that a criminal action is sufficient protection.
3 The rule
seems to have arisen in I89I, 4 and has subsequently been adopted with only one
dissenting voice.' In recent years, however, the increased amount of automobile
and other liability insurance has complicated the problem, for where the parent
is insured, the infant actually intends to sue the company and not the parent.
This distinction was recognized in Dunlap v. Dunlap,
6 where the court was of
the opinion that as the father was protected by insurance, the reason for the
rule failed, and therefore it should not be applied. 7  But the majority is still slow
to make this exception to the rule, holding that the suit is still between the child
and the parent even though the latter is insured., Although it might be argued
that the majority rule is justified in order to prevent collusive actions and perjured
admissions on the part of the insured nominal defendant, the courts seem to be
influenced mainly by the mere form of the suit. Thus, for example, at least one
court has indicated that only where the policy allows the injured party to sue
the insurance company directly would there be no objection to recovery by an
infant. 9 The policy behind the general rule often has some basis in fact, but
it seems futile to make its application depend on such formalities. The courts
i. Rambo v. Rambo, 5 U. S. L. WEK 945 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1938); Mesite v. Kirchen-
stein, iO9 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88
(1927) ; Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935). The courts have not
distinguished between suits by a minor against a parent, and those by a parent against a
minor.
2. Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) (the rule was "carved on the
tablets of Mt. Sinai") ; Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924) ("tendencies
of the unrestrained youth of this generation").
3. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (19o). In this case a father was con-
victed of raping his minor daughter, but the civil suit was not allowed.
4. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 855 (1891). The confusion of cases and text-
writers before this date is discussed in McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Rela-
tions (193o) 43 HAgv. L. Riv. 1O3O.
5. Wells v. Wells, 48 S. W. (2d) lO9 (Mo. App. 1932).
6. 84 N. H. 352, 15o At. 905 (1930). It did not appear clearly from the record in the
instant case whether the defendant was insured or not. Hence the court, while disapproving
the distinction, did not decide the question.
7. Accord: Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932). In this case the child
was injured while riding in a school bus driven by her father who was hired for that pur-
pose by the school board. The court completely rejected the distinction between suing the
parent as such, and suing him in his business capacity, but allowed the suit on the grounds
that the father was covered by insurance. Cf. Maheffey v. Maheffey, 15 Tenn. App. 570
(1932), where an infant was not allowed to sue her father's firm when she suffered injuries
due to his negligence while driving the firm's car in the firm's business. In the instant case,
no mention was made of the fact that the father, a wholesale vegetable dealer, was using the
truck to transport his produce when the injury occurred.
8. Norfolk So. R. R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S. E. 841 (934). The fact that the
injury results in the death of the infant does not seem to make any difference, even though
the indemnity was for all sums which the insured might be liable to pay. Owens v. Auto
Indem. Co., 177 So. 133 (Ala. 1937); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 Atl. 3
(Sup. Ct. 1928).
9. See Mesite v. Kirchenstein, lO9 Conn. 77, 85, 145 Atl. 753, 755 (1929).
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recognize that where the child is emancipated, there is no longer any reason
for refusing recovery, and therefore in such cases suits are freely allowed.Y0 If
similar reasoning was applied to other situations in which the public policy in-
volved in the general rule would not be disturbed, a more realistic and well-
rounded result would be reached.
Trusts-Immunity of Trustee from Liability for Violation of Duty to
Earmark Trust Property Where Trustee Acted in Good Faith and Loss
Was Not Caused by the Breach of Duty-Prior to their formal appoint-
ment as trustees, the defendants, while still executors, purchased a mortgage with
what subsequently became trust funds.' The mortgage was later foreclosed, and,
in taking over the land, the deed was made out in the names of the defend-
ants as trustees but without disclosing the beneficiary,2 although the deed was
privately filed as part of the trust estate of the plaintiff beneficiary. The land de-
preciated in value, due to economic conditions, to an amount less than the price of
the mortgage. The beneficiary refused to accept the deed and sued for the money
originally expended on the mortgage, plus interest. Held (three Justices dis-
senting), that the trustees were not liable for the depreciation in the value of the
land because they acted in good faith and because there was no causal connection
between the loss and the fact that the trustees .had taken the trust property in
their own names. Rotzin v. Miller, 277 N. W. 811 (Neb. 1938).'
This holding rests on the sole authority of the Restatement of Trusts, § 179,
Comment d, which reads: "If the trustee takes title to the trust property in his
own name in good faith and no loss results from his so doing, he is not liable for
breach of trust . . . ." This section of the Restatement qualifies the equitable
dogma supported by a long line of decisions that where a trustee takes title to
trust property in his own name, regardless of good faith, he has violated a duty
to earmark the trust property 4 and thereby becomes liable to account for the
io. Martens v. Martens, ii N. J. Misc. 705, 167 Atl. 227 (Sup. Cf. 1933); Lo Galbo v.
Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. 485, 246 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1931). It is often held that the
mere fact that the child has attained majority is sufficient to allow a suit for injuries sus-
tained thereafter, regardless of whether the child is emancipated. Ferrar v. Ferrar, 41 Ga.
App. 120, 252 S. E. 278 (193o) ; Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So. 627 (La. App. 1934). But con-
trast Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N. J. Misc. 711, 134 Atl. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1926), where it was
held that attaining majority was not prima facie evidence of emancipation. Attaining ma-
jority does not give the child the right to sue for injuries sustained during minority. Rein-
gold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935).
i. When the executors were finally appointed formal trustees, they falsely represented
the mortgage as "cash", thereby concealing the transaction from the court, although the mort-
gage was mentioned in subsequent reports.
2. The deed was first made out in the name of a Securities Company through which the
trustees had acquired the mortgage, and the Company later transferred the deed to the de-
fendants. Although it is stated that the deed was made out to the defendants "as trustees",
apparently no fiduciary relationship in regard to the plaintiff was set forth.
3. This was a rehearing of Rotzin v. Miller, 133 Neb. 4, 274 N. W. 19o (1937), in which
the previous holding was vacated and set aside.
4. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 596; RFSTATEmENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 179.
Thus, certificates of stock should be issued in the name of the trustee as trustee. Van Dusen's
Appeal, 1O2 Pa. 224 (1883) ; Converse v. Paret, 228 Pa. 156, 77 Atl. 429 (igio). Similarly,
a trustee is required to keep his own deposits in a bank strictly divorced from those deposited
for the cestui que trust. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other
Money (1913) 27 HARV. L. Rav. 125. Likewise with respect to the purchase of mortgages.
Quest's Estate, 324 Pa. 230. 188 Atl. 137 (936). The reasons for the existence of this duty
upon the trustee to carefully earmark trust property are well stated in 3 BOGERT, supra at
1883.
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purchase money with interest. 5  The present holding appears to be the second
instance 6 of a court applying the rule of the Restatement as the controlling
authority, although other courts have held similarly either without recourse to
the Restatement 7 or prior to its publication.' Despite the unequivocal language
of the Restatement, however, it is exceedingly doubtful that the rule was intended
to apply to the present factual situation. The illustration presented by the Re-
statement deals with the trustee of a mortgage, who, in order to prevent a merger,
takes the conveyance from the mortgagor temporarily in his own name, thereby
saving the trust estate the expense of a foreclosure proceeding.9 The technical
breach of trust involved is overlooked in favor of the benefit accruing to the
estate. But in the instant case it is difficult to discern in what way the trust estate
would gain by having the trustees take the trust propery in their own names, and
it is equally difficult to impute anything but bad faith to the trustees who did so.' 0
If the value of the land had suddenly risen, the trustees might have sold the land
with impunity, realizing a handsome profit for themselves, while they returned to
the trust fund only the amount taken from it. Perhaps this might explain why
the minority, in a vigorous dissent,'" felt moved to discredit § 179, Comment d
of the Restatement of Trusts by accusing it of inconsistency with its sister section
in the Restatement of Agency. 2 If § 179, Comment d is to retain its value as a
wisely mitigating exception to the usual exacting standard of conduct required of
a trustee,'3 it ought to be stringently limited in application, lest it be exploited
to cover a multitude of fiduciary sins.'
4
5. ". . . the cestui que trust has the option to accept the investment or require the trus-
tee to account for the purchase money with interest." Freas' Estate, 231 Pa. 256, 258, 79 Ati.
513 (1911); Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); Morris v.
Wallace, 3 Pa. 319 (1846) ; Royer's Appeal, ii Pa. 36 (1849) ; Yost's Estate, 316 Pa. 463,
175 AtI. 383 (1934) ; Quest's Estate, 324 Pa. 23o, 188 Atl. 137 (1936) ; 3 BOGERT, op. cit.
mupra note 3, § 596. Cf. Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 AtI. 248 (1936).
6. The distinction of being the first to lend judicial authority to § 179, comment d must
be apparently awarded to a Connecticuit court. Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat'1
Bank and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 186 Atl. 543 (3936).
7. Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 At. 248 (1936) ; Dillon's Estate, 324 Pa. 352, I88
Atl. 134 (1936). The corresponding section of the Tentative Draft, § 174, did not contain
the rule as it now appears in the Restatement.
8. Keen's Estate, 3o6 Pa. 363, 159 AtI. 713 (1932).
9. Of course there is no way of knowing positively (other than consulting the Reporter),
but it is fairly certain that the draftsmen of comment d had in mind Keen's Estate, 3o6 Pa.
363, 159 Atl. 713 (1932), when they framed their illustration.
io. Especially in light of the fact that the trustees falsified the accounts in their first rec-
ord of the trust submitted to the court. See note i supra, and the instant case at 814.
ii. Instant case at 814. "Being firmly convinced from the standpoints of law, equity,
fact and justice that the opinion of the majority upon a trial de novo is wrong in every ma-
terial respect, we are impelled to make a solemn protest against the decision."
12. "If the agent violates his duty to keep the funds of the principal distinct from his own
and in the principal's name and if, while so improperly . . . deposited in the agent's name,
the fund suffers loss, whether or not the loss is due to the agent's wrongful act, he is subject
to liability to the principal for the amount of the original fund with interest from the time of
the breach of duty." RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 398, comment d.
13. See the oft-quoted paragraph from the opinion of Cardozo, J., in Meinhard v. Sal-
mon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928).
14. The instant case should be carefully distinguished from other cases involving so-
called "participation mortgages" in which it has been held that it is sufficient if the trustee
merely keeps a private record for each cestui que trust without disclosing on the mortgage
face the exact fiduciary relationship involved. Guthrie's Estate, .20 Pa. 530, 182 Atl. 248
(1936), Note (1936) 303 A. L. R. 192. See also RFSTATE ENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 227 -
